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Patents act as an incentive to innovate. However, as this paper argues, patents can
l e a dt h ep a t e n th o l d e rt or e s to nh i sl a u r e l sa n da tt h es a m et i m ed i s c o u r a g es o m e
innovators from innovating, reducing knowledge spillovers. The combined result of
the above suggests an inverse U relationship between patent protection and output
growth.
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In recent years we have witnessed an increase in patent protection in the US. This increase
has been manifested through the formation of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit
(Federal Courts Improvements Act) in 1982, the introduction of the Patent and Trademark
Laws Amendment (Bayh-Dole) in 1980, the increase in patent length form 17 to 20 years, and
the introduction of patent protection for previously unpatentable works, such as software and
business methods. This increase is not restricted to the US and similar developments have been
introduced worldwide through WIPO and TRIPS. It seems that strong patent protection is a
modern day ‘mantra’, which postulates that it oﬀers greater incentives to innovators, increasing
overall economic performance.
Various scholars have criticized the above view. For example, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh
(2000) ￿nd that despite the fact that ￿rms are taking out many more patents, managers do
not perceive patents to be any more eﬀective. This view coincides with evidence from Hall
and Ziedonis (2001), who note that for technology sectors (such as microprocessors) where
innovators are interlocked in using each other￿s technology, patents act as a ‘secondary defense’
in protecting innovation and ￿rms cross-license their patents to rival ￿rms. Such critical views
are not restricted to the empirical literature. From a theoretical perspective, O￿Donaghue,
Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) also cast doubt on the above view, noting that true as it may be
that a patent rewards the present innovator, it nevertheless hinders all future re-innovation.
The importance of this issue is further highlighted by recent evidence from Lerner (2004),
who in an international analysis of the relationship between patent strength and innovation,
examines 177 policy shifts in 60 countries over 150 years and ￿nds some support for an inverse
U relationship. On the basis of the above, the aim of this paper is to examine whether patent
protection promotes innovation and output growth.
While accounting for the view that patents reward the innovator, acting as stimuli, this
paper will also concentrate on two additional ways through which greater patent protection
can aﬀect innovation. The ￿rst one is based on the idea that the more one feels a competitor￿s
breath behind his back the more he is forced to run. This idea, which goes back to Beath,
1Katsoulakos and Ulph (1989), as well as Harris and Vickers (1987), implies that a decrease in
patent protection should increase competition for the most successful technology (because all
innovators will be able to freely copy the latest innovation) forcing competitors to adopt risky
innovation strategies. Such strategies can potentially lead to breakthroughs as well as failures.
To oﬀer an example of how strong patent protection can eﬀectively lead an innovator to rest on
his laurels, in the 1890s Edison successfully patented his light-bulb ￿lament invention, however
until the patent expired General Electric did not improve on this technology. In addition, even
though other companies had created a better light bulb, General Electric managed (through
successful litigation) to keep competitors out of the market, increasing its market share and
sales.
The second way is channeled through knowledge spillovers. Speci￿cally, an increase in
patent protection will make it harder for other innovators to bypass a patent. Lerner (1995),
working on biotechnology ￿rms, ￿nds that this diﬃc u l t ym a yf o r c es o m ei n n o v a t o r st oa b s t a i n
from innovating in this particular sector. Such a reduction in innovative eﬀort may lead to a
drop in knowledge spillovers. Therefore, in a broad way, the model concentrates on the merits of
duplication, acknowledging that if many innovators work on the same technology, even though
some of their work is mere duplication, they create knowledge spillovers that can potentially
aﬀect all innovators.
The argument of the paper will be substantiated through a static tournament model where
many innovators race to create the greatest technology. The introduction of the tournament
allows one to speci￿cally model competition between innovators. In the second part of the
paper, in order to study the eﬀect that patent protection has on output growth, this tournament
model will be extended to include, similar to Loury (1979), a simple dynamic endogenous
growth framework based on Aghion and Howitt (1992). It should be noted that the growth
model is not essential to the paper￿s results. In fact, all the important comparative statics
will be proved within the static framework before I re-introduce them to the dynamic model.
Nonetheless, the latter model allows one to concentrate on the following question, what is the
optimal patent protection, the one that maximizes output growth? Accounting for the above,
running a numerical simulation on the latter model I ￿nd that there is an inverse U relationship
2between patent protection and output growth.
The notion of patent protection used refers to patent breadth, where patent breadth will
be de￿ned as the re-innovation that is allowed to take place within the boundaries of legal
protection. In addition, patent breadth will be a choice variable for the central planner, who
is supposed to act on behalf of the courts and the PTO, and whose objective is to maximize
output growth. This de￿nition diﬀers from the ones used in the literature. For example, Gilbert
and Shapiro (1990) suggest that a greater breadth is one that increases the ￿ow rate of the
innovator￿s pro￿ts, while Klemperer (1990) concentrates on the quality advantage of the patent
holder. In addition, Gallini￿s de￿nition, Gallini (1992), is one involving the cost of imitation,
while Scotchmer and Green (1995) focus on the division of pro￿ts. In broad terms the de￿nition
of patent breadth suggested here is similar to Matutes, Regibeau and Rockett (1996). Overall,
in broad terms, one can interpret patent breadth as either the number of patent claims the PTO
allows for, or how strong is the courts￿ attitude towards infringement. Hence, the model will
not be discussing the time dimension of patents. This is due to the already extended discussion
that this issue has received during the 90s, albeit in the context of models whose objective
was to minimize the deadweight loss that is associated with patents; see Gallini (2002) for a
literature review.
This paper is not the only one examining patent breadth in the context of a tournament.1
Tournaments have also been studied by Denicol￿ (2000 and 1996), however, the emphasis here is
on the patent breadth that maximizes output growth. Therefore, the model distances itself from
Denicol￿ (2000), Chang (1995), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990) and Nordhaus
(1969) who concentrate on social welfare.
In addition, this is not the only paper that ￿nds a non-linear relationship between patent pro-
tection and innovation/output.2 Horowitz and Lai (1996), show that there is a non-monotonic
relationship between the rate of innovation and patent length. The argument that they present
is that an increase in patent length leads to larger, but less frequent, innovations.
The model is not without its drawbacks. For example, in order to clarify the analysis, I have
1For a review of tournament models see Reinganum (1989).
2See Gallini (2002) for a survey.
3labored under the assumption that there is no cross licensing, and I have limited any strategic
interaction between the innovators, allowing it to be present only when tournaments become
highly competitive. In addition, I have assumed that there is no cost attached to risk. In reality
this is not true. However, as I argue, when a tournament becomes highly competitive innovators
choose to follow high-risk strategies. Therefore, if there is an increasing cost attached on risk,
when the tournament becomes more competitive it will decrease the pro￿ts of some participants
leading them to abstain from taking part in the tournament. Such a decrease in the number of
innovators will decrease knowledge spillovers adversely aﬀecting innovation. Overall, attaching
an increasing cost on risk imposes on the model an additional eﬀect on knowledge spillovers, one
that is similar to the one that I have already described in a previous paragraph. Subsequently,
in order to avoid any duplication and make the model tractable I abstain from attaching an
increasing cost on risk
The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the tournament and the way
technology is generated. Section 3 displays the model￿s main properties. Section 4 extents the
model by introducing a simple growth framework, while section 5 contains the simulation and
it is followed by the conclusions.
2 Assumptions
In what follows the paper will focus on industries such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.
These are industries where patent protection is a successful way of protecting one￿s innovation,
and, accordingly, patents are essential to ￿rms. In addition, these industries face a lot of
obsolescence, making the latest innovation by far the most important and useful one, both in
production and as a base for further research.
I here frequently use the terms innovation, technology and neck and neck markets. To avoid
confusion, I will provide a de￿nition of these terms. For the purpose of this paper, technology
A is the sum of many sequential individual innovations. Innovations, in turn, are de￿ned as
marketable technological advances, which are not obvious beforehand to someone skilled in
the prior art. In this model, an innovation ∆A, will be the result of the winning innovator￿s
4research between tournaments. As a neck and neck (for simplicity N-N) market/tournament, I
de￿ne a market in which the technologies of the innovators are almost of identical magnitude.
Therefore, a N-N market is a highly competitive one, because the innovators are positioned
closely to each other.
Many heterogeneous potential-innovators participate in a series of tournaments in which all
the participants have full information about each other. Hence there are no trade secrets and
an innovator has no option but to patent his innovation in order to protect it from imitators.3
Innovators are assumed to be risk-neutral individuals, and their role is to form the idea that will
become an innovation. In order to participate in tournament t (where t denotes the ordering
of periods and tournaments), innovators must incur a sunk cost C which represents the cost of
building a laboratory and the eﬀort to diﬀu s ei no n e ￿ sr e s e a r c ht h el a t e s t￿ndings by universities
etc. The objective of a tournament is to build a technology of the greatest possible magnitude.
Hence, when a tournament ends, the winner will be the innovator who builds such a technology.
Each tournament will lead to only one technology, which will be employed in the production of
a consumption good.
The technological advances that the remaining innovators achieved during the tournament
will be treated as inventions. These inventions can be used as a base for one￿s future research
but they will not ￿nd any marketable application, unless the innovator succeeds in winning a
tournament. If an innovator chooses not to take part in a tournament he stops his research.
In order to innovate the innovator needs to employ research workers n.T h e s ew o r k e r s ,w h o
are assumed to be homogeneous, will receive, similar to Jones (2001), a ￿xed percentage   of the
revenues that the innovation generates. The remaining 1 −   will be the innovator￿s payment.
The revenues that an innovation ∆At generates are πt. For simplicity, I will assume that πt is
a positive function of ∆At,a n dt h a tnt depends positively on the expected revenues from ∆At.
In the ￿r s tp a r to ft h ep a p e rIw i l ln o to ﬀer any microeconomics structure backing these two
assumptions. This will be included in the second part of the paper.
3In the absence of trade secrets the innovator must patent his ideas even when he fails to win the tournament.
Otherwise, he will allow other innovators to free ride on his technology making it harder for him to win future
tournaments, because he will have to compete with many other innovators who have the same technology.
5If one was to introduce an endogenous labour market condition determining how pro￿ts are
divided between the innovator and the n research workers, this must be directly or indirectly
aﬀected by the model￿s main variable of interest, namely patent breadth. However, there seems
to be (as far as I know) no empirical evidence connecting the labour market to patent breadth.
An alternative assumption would be to allow (as Jones (2001) eﬀectively does) the innovator
to appropriate a greater part of pro￿ts as patent breadth increases. It should be stressed that
working under such an assumption does not alter the paper￿s results and ￿nal formulas.
Innovators innovate sequentially.4 Assuming that no cross-licencing takes place, the inno-
vation that the innovator builds in the course of a tournament adds to the technology that he
had developed in the previous tournament,5 (i.e. At =
t X
0
∆At), where patents are assumed
to last for two periods. If there is no (or limited) patent protection innovators will manage
to re-innovate around the winner￿s patent (re-innovation implies the legal development of an
innovation with similar or identical capabilities). If there is patent protection, depending on
how much re-innovating is allowed, the innovators will use either their own innovation, or the
one that they built by re-innovating (whichever one is of larger magnitude). At the same time,
since patents reveal how an innovation functions this information will spillover to all innovators.
For example, if an innovator works on catalysts, any information included in all other inno-
vators￿ patents (who also work on catalysts), assists the innovator in his research eﬀort. This
could be because the innovator becomes aware of the research path that the other innovators
have followed and what type of research should be avoided, or simply because the innovator has
knowledge of what all the other innovators are currently working on. Nevertheless, this knowl-
edge cannot be translated into an innovation because it is protected by a patent. Therefore,
even though the innovator knows and understands the latest catalyst technology, he cannot use
it without licence. If he wants to use it he must either pay royalties for a licence (this does not
happen in this model because no cross-licencing is allowed), or attempt to re-innovate around
4There is a considerable literature which explores the time technology generation process in situations where
the R&D investment of the ￿rm endogenously shapes technology. For a review see Baldwin and Scott (1987).
5This assumption implies that the tournament will not be a memoryless race, unlike the tournament models
of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), and Reinganum (1984).
6the patent. This re-innovation will take place during the next tournament.
In the light of the above, (denoting the technology of the winning innovator j, during
tournament t as At,j and his innovation as ∆At,j), innovator i (a follower) will be able to
advance his technology At,i by max{∆At,i, λ∆At,j},w h e r eλ ∈ (0,1) indicates how much re-
innovating around ∆At,j innovator i can do.6 In this context, λ c a nb ec o n s i d e r e da sp a t e n t
breadth. For example, if λ is close to zero then i cannot re-innovate around the innovation of
innovator j. On the contrary, if λ is close to one then i can re-innovate around, which suggests
that i will end up with an innovation that is of equal size to that of the winner. Accounting
for the above, the technology of innovator j is,
At,j = At−1,j +m a x{∆At,i, λ∆At,j} (1)
In this framework, one way of increasing tournament-based competition is to increase λ,
making it easier for the followers to re-innovate around the leader￿s technology. This way, the
followers will increase their technology getting closer to the leader. However, since λ 6= 1 and
patent length is two periods long ceteris paribus an increase in λ will not create a tournament
where all innovators have identical technologies. Thus, the tournament is unlikely to become
perfectly competitive. Henceforth, λ will be considered a policy instrument used by the central
planner.7
The time-line of the model is the following. Competing innovators employ research workers
and start their research while participating in a tournament. At the beginning of the tourna-
ment innovators make all the irreversible decisions regarding innovation, choosing what type of
innovation path to follow. Production will take place immediately before the next tournament
commences.
6λ cannot be one because in reality there exists tacit knowledge, which does not allow full re-innovation to
take place. In addition, it is practically impossible to allow no re-innovation to take place. Therefore, λ>0.
7In reality, even though (in the US) patent breadth is decided by the PTO, the courts and Congress, it is
up to the ￿rm to seek litigation if it ￿nds out that rivals have used its technology.
72.1 Technology
The purpose of this section is to study how technology is built. I will assume that any discovery
is the combined result of four factors, prior art, luck, research workers and knowledge spillovers.
Prior art, in the form of the already made technological discovery ∆At−1,j, is the building block
on which one can base his research. Without prior art one must start from scratch. In addition
to prior art, research workers nt,j must be used because they are the ones who create the
innovation. In the absence of the above inputs, the resulting innovation will be dependent on
luck and on the risk that the innovator is willing to employ in his research.
Furthermore, as Segerstrom (1998) argues, the more advanced (complicated) technology is
the harder it is to innovate. Therefore, prior art can also aﬀect innovation in a negative way.
However, as Panagopoulos (2003) notes, an increase in knowledge spillovers st,j increases the
innovator￿s ability to cope with complicated prior art, where in this framework st,j express the
collective experience that all the tournament participants (absent j) generate by patenting their
innovations. Subsequently, the greater the knowledge spillovers that an innovator manages to
attain the less the diﬃculty that he will face during the innovation process.
In what follows, I will introduce a technology generation function, which describes how










c>0, σt,j ∈ [0,1]
to develop a series of innovations ∆At,j that will allow him to create a technology and participate
in the tournament. The initial condition for equation (2) is ∆A0 ≥ 0. To avoid multiple winners
in the ￿rst tournament, I will make the assumption that only one innovator has the initial idea
to generate ∆A0.




t,j expresses an innovation as the combined result of prior art
∆At−1,j a n dr e s e a r c hw o r k e r snt,j. In addition,
c∆At−1,j
st−1,j describes the increase in diﬃculty that
an innovator faces when he tries to create increasingly larger innovations.
Lastly, zt,j, which is distributed with a mean 0, is a term that can produce irregular steps
8of magnitude σt,jzt,j. These steps can vary both upward and downward and are ap r i o r i
unforeseen. Because of that, σt,jzt,j is used to represent luck. Moreover, since the greater σt,j
is, the greater the possible range of σt,jzt,j becomes, one can use σt,j to represent how risky
ap r o j e c ti s . 8 Since σt,jzt,j can attain negative values it is possible for ∆At,j to be less than
zero.9 If this turns out to be true, it implies that research has followed the wrong path. In
this case, the innovator will not make use of ∆At,j.10 An example of a technology that did not
generate the expected results, would be the High De￿nition TV (HDTV). In the late 1980￿s this
was a promising European TV standard that turned out to be far costly and outdated (when
compared to the USA TV technology of its time).11
In equation (2), ∆At,j is the result of the latest prior art ∆At−1,j.T r u ea si tm a yb et h a t
such an assumption accords well with the way research is carried out in industries such as
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (because of the high obsolescence rate that they face), one
can also provide an alternative/complementary intuition. Accordingly, bearing in mind that
patents last for 2 periods, At−2 must be common and well understood knowledge. Subsequently,
bearing in mind that research workers are homogeneous, any research that uses At−2 as a base
for developing new knowledge should produce similar results among all innovators. Therefore,
in addition to the ∆At,j that is generated via ∆At−1,j, through equation (2), one should expect
innovators to create a common ∆A based on At−2. To avoid any duplication, bearing in mind
that luck does not depend on A, it is only the latest increment ∆At,j (the one produced through
8In general one should expect that research paths that involve greater risk, if successful, should lead to
innovations of greater magnitude (when compared with less risky research paths). For a discussion on the
uncertainty surrounding innovation see, Rosenberg (1996).
9By contrast, since z has a zero mean and ∆At−1,i =m a x{∆At−1,i, λ∆At−1,j},w h e r eλ ∈ (0,1),t h eE∆At,i
that is given by equation (2) is always greater than zero.
10Accounting for this negative innovation, one should rewrite equation (1) as, At,j = At−1,j +
max{0, ∆At,i, λ∆At,j}.
11In 1991 the European Commission, in an initiative that was backed up by various satellite interests, proposed
an expensive plan, which was worth of 850 million Euro, to support the HDTV standard plan. There was
considerable debate in the Council about the budget, but ￿nally the issue was dropped, with the justi￿cation
being that a more advanced technology was already available in the US. For a detailed discussion of the HDTV
project see Braithwaite and Drahos (2000).
9equation (2)) that is aﬀected by luck. Accounting for the above, considering that the model
will concentrate on the diﬀerences between the technologies created by the innovators, common
terms will always cancel out allowing one to focus only on how the latest prior art eﬀects the
creation of an innovation.
In order for an innovator to win the tournament he must create a technology that is greater
than the one created by all other innovators. Accordingly, I will endow each innovator j with
an expected probability Ept,j of winning the tournament. I will allow Ept,j (At,j, At,i) ∈ [0,1],
i 6= j, i ∈ [1, vt − j] to be a function of the technology that j is expected to create, as well
as of the technology that all other innovators i 6= j are expected to create. In this context,




∂EAt,i < 0. The latter inequalities imply that the greater
one￿s expected technology is the greater his chances of wining the tournament are. Moreover,
the greater the expected technology of one￿s competitors is, the lower his chances of winning
the tournament are. Furthermore, I will allow for all cross derivatives to be small enough to
eﬀectively be considered as zero.12
Intuitive as Ept,j (At,j, At,i) may be it is always preferable to provide some mathematical
intuition and an exact mathematical function that backs such an assumption. As Appendix
one shows, this can be done by working in continuous time, viewing equation (2) as an Ito￿s
stochastic diﬀerential equation. This being the case, using the Kolmogorov’s backward equation
one can derive the probability that j has of creating a technology that is greater than i0s.T h e
main drawback of this approach, even though it leads to similar results as the rest of the paper,
is its increased mathematical diﬃculty, and its reliance on graphical interpretations.
2.2 Finding the number of tournament participants
In this section, the innovators￿ motive to participate in the tournament is explored. Accordingly,
I will try to determine which innovators ￿nd it pro￿table to enter the tournament (thus I will try
to determine v). In order to ￿nd who enters, I will examine the innovator￿s value of entering the
current tournament. In doing so, I will treat the decision to innovate as an investment decision.
12Even though this assumption simpli￿es the results the model￿s proofs will not change if one allows the cross
derivatives to be diﬀerent than zero.
10In this case, the investment will have a limited horizon of one period and it must commence at
the beginning of the tournament. Thereby, in a fashion similar to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), I
will form the innovator￿s expected option value function to investing.13 One should expect that
only innovators who have a positive option value will decide to take part in the tournament.
In this context, the expected option value of an innovator j is,
Ft,j =( 1 −  )Ept,jπt,j − C (3)
In equation (3), Ft,j is the expected option value to the investment of innovator j (the option
value of entering the tournament), C is the sunk cost of entry and (1 −  )πt,j are the pro￿ts
that the winner gets from employing his technology in the production of a consumption good
(thus (1 −  )Ept,jπt,j are the expected revenues from the innovation).
Only innovators who have an Ft,j > 0 will take part in the tournament. Subsequently,
since the greater Ept,j (At,j, At,i) is the higher (1 −  )Ept,jπt,j is, innovators who have a higher
probability of winning the tournament are more likely to participate in the tournament, because
for these innovators (1 −  )Ept,jπt,j >Cand Ft,j > 0.T h en u m b e rvt of the innovators who
have a positive Ft,j is of interest, since it determines the magnitude of the knowledge spillovers
st,j;i n c r e a s e si nvt increase the st,j available to the innovators, leading to a greater ∆At,j.
3 Some comparative statics based on patent breadth
In this section I will compare the eﬀects that diﬀerent types of tournaments can have on
innovation. The main diﬀerence between tournaments will be on how close the innovators are
positioned to each other. As I mentioned in section 2, one can vary the distance between
innovators by changing the patent breadth λ allowing innovators to re-innovate more. Thereby,
the question that this section poses is the following, what impact will an increase in λ have on
innovation?
To this question the model indicates that patent breadth can aﬀect innovation in three
diﬀerent ways. The ￿rst one indicates that an increase in tournament competition (caused by
13See also, Grenadier (1996), Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998), Lambrecht and Perraudin (1997).
11an increase in λ) can be detrimental for innovation. Hence, a tournament where only one (or
a few) innovators can win is preferable to a tournament in which all innovators have equal
chances. Speci￿cally, as λ increases and innovators get closer (increasing At,i), the expected
probability Ept,j (At,j, At,i) that innovator j has of winning the tournament is reduced, reducing
the expected revenues from the innovation Ept,jEπt,j. Such a reduction in expected revenues
should lead to a lower nt,j and a drop in ∆At,j.
The above argument describes how the leading innovator will respond as λ increases. The
second way that a change in λ can aﬀect innovation reverses the above result, examining how the
followers will respond. The rational behind this rests on the increase in knowledge spillovers that
one should expect if more innovators participate in the tournament. Speci￿cally, noting that the
tournament never becomes perfectly competitive (since λ 6= 1 and patent length is two periods
long), any increase in λ increases the technologies of the lagging innovators. Therefore, ceteris
paribus, such an increase in technology should lead to an increase in the lagging innovators￿
probability to win the tournament, making it pro￿table for more lagging innovators to enter
the tournament, increasing knowledge spillovers, leading to a greater innovation.
Speci￿cally, section 2.1 introduced for each innovator an expected probability of success
Ept,j (At,j, At,i). This probability depends on his EAt,j,a sw e l la so nt h eEAt,i of all the
other innovators. If an innovator has a greater EAt,j (compared to the other innovators), he
increases his expected probability of winning the tournament, while decreasing that of the other
innovators. However, a drop in the expected probability of winning the tournament (caused by
ad e c r e a s ei nλ , which brings the innovators further apart) leads to a reduction in the Ft,j,s e e
equation (3), forcing some innovators to abstain from entering the tournament, reducing vt and






st−1,j + σt,jzt,j,i f
st,j decreases, there should be a decrease in ∆At+1,j. Flipping the argument, any increase in
competition, which leads the followers to increase their EAt,i, should ceteris paribus increase
the followers￿ Ept,i.Ag r e a t e rEpt,i implies an increase in the followers￿ Ft,i,w h i c hs u g g e s tt h a t
more innovators will enter the tournament.
The last way through which λ can aﬀect innovation is channeled though risk σ.S p e c i ￿cally,
if the central planner is to increase λ allowing many innovators to get close enough as to form
12a N-N tournament, these innovators will only have one option if they want to win, namely to
increase their risk. This is because in N-N tournaments innovators are positioned close enough
to have a similar At−1 and a similar probability of winning. Therefore, an innovator cannot
win based on his technology.
In detail, innovators maximize expected pro￿ts (1 −  )Ept,jEπt,j with respect to σt,j.S i n c e
they are not aware of future realization of z they can only solve a static problem. Furthermore,
z can only become evident once the tournament commences, while σ must be chosen at the
beginning of the tournament. However, if a tournament is a N-N one it is impossible for the
winner to have a negative realization of z,b e c a u s eh ew o u l d￿nd it impossible to win and
his place would be taken by an innovator with a positive z.T h eo n l yw a yp o s s i b l et oh a v ea
negative z and still win is if all the other contestants also have a negative z, but this should be
ruled out in tournaments with many participants.
Accordingly, if one is to solve the above maximization problem, accounting for a positive z,
the FOC is given by the following equation, (1 −  )
∂Ept,j
∂σt,j Eπt,j +( 1 −  )Ept,j
∂Eπt,j
∂σt,j =0 .U s i n g











∂EAt,i must always be greater than zero. This relationship
implies that the closer any innovator i gets to innovator j the greater the risk that innovator






st−1,j + σt,jzt,j the greater σt,j is, the
greater ∆At,j will be.
This result, which shows that in N-N tournaments with many participants an increase in
tournament competition will lead innovators to take more risk, increasing the magnitude of ∆A,
is equivalent to that of Beath Katsoulakos and Ulph (1989), who note that the more one feels a
competitors￿s breath behind his back the more he is forced to run. It also establishes that risk
can be an endogenous choice variable, adding to the ￿ndings of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)
and Klette and de Meza (1986), who found that patent races yield excessive risky technologies.
134 Introducing a growth framework
In this section I will introduce the main aspects of the growth model, which is broadly based
on Aghion and Howitt (1992). Unless otherwise stated all the assumptions included in the ￿rst
part of the paper continue to apply. Speci￿cally, there are three classes of tradable objects.
The ￿rst one is labor, the second one is a non-storable consumption good and the third one
is an intermediate good. In addition, there is a continuum of in￿nitely-lived individuals, with
identical intertemporal additive preferences, which are de￿ned over lifetime consumption and
a constant rate of time preference.
Assuming no disutility from supplying labor, there are three categories of labor. The ￿rst
one is unskilled workers x. These workers are all equipped with one unit of labor and are
used for producing an intermediate input, which will be employed in the production of the
consumption good. Similar to Aghion and Howitt (1992), unskilled workers can also function
as ￿rms whose aim is to produce the consumption good. The second category is skilled workers
in the form of research workers n. Both skilled and unskilled workers are homogeneous, operate
in an environment of perfect labor mobility and can exchange roles. For simplicity, assuming no
population growth, the total number of research workers n and production workers x is equal
to L>1, i.e.,
L = xt + nt (4)
The third category of labor is innovators, the number of innovators who decide to take part
in a tournament is 1 ≤ vt <L ;t h u sj ∈ [1,L). Contrary to production workers and research
workers innovators are heterogeneous. Innovators are assumed to be risk-neutral individuals
and their role is to form the idea that will become an innovation, where each innovation consists
of the invention of a new intermediate good, whose use as an input allows more eﬃcient methods
to be used in producing the consumption good. Innovators employ research workers and create
an innovation using equation (2). However, as Jones (1998) notes, for this class of models growth
stops being endogenous unless technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. Subsequently, in
a fashion similar to Romer (1990), ζ + ξ>1.
Since no credit market is supposed to exist, all non-research workers consume their wage
14at each instant and research workers receive no payment unless they win the tournament, in
which case they are paid a ￿xed percentage   of the revenues from the innovation that they
have created. The remaining revenues will be transferred to the innovator. If an innovator fails
to win a tournament, since the research workers that he used will receive no salary, they have
no option but to be employed in production.
Similar to the benchmark model, the consumption good is produced in a perfectly compet-
itive market by a ￿rm that licenses the patent from the innovator, using an intermediate good





t, {α, b} > 0 (5)
In equation (5), yt represents the output produced using the innovation of the tournament￿s
winner j. Since, no matter who wins the tournament, there is only one type of consumption
good, I will abstain from attaching a subscript to yt.
The time-line of the model is the following. Competitors employ research workers and start
their research while participating in a tournament. At the beginning of the tournament innova-
tors make all the irreversible decisions regarding innovation, choosing what type of innovation
path to follow and how many research workers to employ. After the tournament they license
their innovation to a production ￿rm. Production will take place immediately before the next
tournament commences.
4.1 Solving the model
In this section I will solve the model. Speci￿cally, the research workers nt,j that innovator j
employs receive a payment wt,j that is equal to an   percentage of the expected revenues from
the innovation that they expect to create. If they fail to win they will receive no payment.





15Since the consumption good is produced in a perfectly competitive market, similar to Aghion





t,j − wt,jxt,j (7)
where wt,jxt,j expresses the wage that the production workers will receive. Substituting equation






 Ept,j + xt,j
(8)
The innovator maximizes its expected revenues with respect to the research workers that







t (1 −  )Ept,jEπt,j (9)








where ∆A is used as a state variable. In equation (9), the time horizon is between t and ∞
because the innovator may win more than one tournaments. Through the above problem the
innovator maximizes his expected pro￿ts accounting explicitly for all the re-innovation that
will take place at time t. T h i si sb e c a u s eEpt,j (At,j, At,i) accounts for the technologies of
all the other i 6= j innovators, including the technologies that they develop by re-innovating.
Furthermore, he also implicitly accounts for all future innovations that will be based (due to
re-innovation) on his technology. This line of thinking suggests that the innovators accounts
for both lagging and leading breadth.
In the steady state (where nt+1,i = nt,i = n) all innovators are expected to develop innova-
tions of non-changing magnitude ∆A. Thereby, the distance between innovators is not expected
to ￿uctuate. Subsequently, if λ does not change, the ratio Pt =
Ept,j
Ept−1,j should be equal to one.













16In what follows I will display that the comparative statics of section 3 still apply. In detail,
the ￿rst way through which λ can aﬀect innovation indicates that an increase in tournament
competition (caused by an increase in λ) can be detrimental for innovation. Speci￿cally, as λ
increases and innovators get closer (increasing At,i), the expected probability that innovator
j has of winning the tournament is reduced, reducing Pt,j =
Ept,j
Ept−1,j. However, equation (10)
suggests that in the steady state, if ζ<1, any increase in λ, which decreases P, should lower
n,n e g a t i v e l ya ﬀecting innovation. Furthermore, the second way that a change in λ can aﬀect
innovation reverses the above result, examining how the followers will respond. This result is
not based on the assumptions of the growth model. Thus, its intuition is identical to the one
of section 3.
The third way through which λ aﬀects ∆A, similar to section 3, concentrates on the increase
in risk that innovators are forced to adopt when the tournament becomes N-N with many
participants. Speci￿cally, innovators maximize expected pro￿ts (1 −  )Ept,jπt,j with respect to
σt,j. Since they are not aware of future realization of z they can only solve a static problem.
Following the same reasoning as in section 3, if one is to solve this maximization problem,
















∂EAt,i must always be greater
than zero. The above intuition suggests that in N-N tournaments with many participants
an increase in tournament competition will lead innovators to take more risk, increasing the
magnitude of ∆A.
5 The link between patent breadth and growth
Bearing in mind that the previous sections have indicated a possible non-monotonic relation-
ship between patent breadth and innovation (production), this section examines if this non-
monotonic relationship exists in the context of this model. Noting that I lack a data set that
would allow me to calibrate the model, or even an exact function for knowledge spillovers and
Ept,j (At,j, At,i), it is best to view this section as a numerical exercise, run for educational
17purposes. Subsequently, all the values/functions that I will be using during this experiment
are ad hoc, even though they accord to what the literature has been using in similar cases.
Nevertheless, when in doubt (such as with  ), I experimented with a whole range of values.
Accordingly, in this section I will try and ￿nd the optimal patent breadth, the one that maxi-
mizes the economy￿s output growth rate. If such an optimal patent breadth exists, then there
must be some form of concavity between output growth rate and patent breath.
With the above in mind, in order to account for the joint eﬀects of λ on the economy￿s output
growth rate I run a numerical experiment over a series of tournaments, gradually increasing the
degree of technological competition by increasing the value of λ in each consecutive tournament.
It should be noted that in order to avoid any unexpected eﬀects caused by the randomness of
z, each tournament consisted of 20 periods during which λ remained steady. It is the mean rate
of output growth from these 20 periods that I used as the output growth rate of each individual
tournament.
Speci￿cally, for each of the 20 periods (denoted by t) within a tournament I numerically
solved the problem of equation (9) and run equations (2)-(4), (7)-(8) for 100 heterogenous
innovators. Throughout this numerical experiment the technology of innovator i was equal to
the ratio of
At,i
At,j,w h e r ej is the winner of period t. Furthermore, I allowed the probability
function to be equal to, Ept,j (At,j, At,i)=1 − 0.5exp(EAt,i − EAt,j), which accords well to
the assumptions made about Ept,j (At,j, At,i),w h e r et h e0.5 was included just in case the two
innovators had identical technologies. As an alternative, I used the probability function derived
in Appendix one.
In the ￿rst period of each tournament a starting technology, randomly distributed (using
a Normal distribution) in the interval [1,δ], was assigned to each innovator. This technology
did not change between tournaments. Therefore, at the ￿rst period of each tournament all
innovators had the same starting value as in the past one. This intuition implies that some
innovators had a starting technology that was close to 1 and some close to δ.I n t h e s a m e
fashion, each innovator had a diﬀerent z, randomly distributed (using a Normal distribution)
in the interval [−δ,δ], which varied with each period. The starting value of σ was zero, because
the starting tournament was not supposed to be a highly competitive tournament. However,
18with each tournament σ gradually increases until it becomes equal to 1 in the last tournament.
With respect to spillovers, I used the following functional form, st,j =
vt−j X
1
γi∆At,i,w h i c h
treats knowledge spillovers as a weighted sum of the innovations created by all innovators
except j. In the latter equation, γi ≥ 0 indicates the weight with which the technology of each
innovator entered the spillover￿s function, where, similar to Hall Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2000),
not all innovations ￿nd equal use in generating knowledge spillovers. Subsequently, similar to
Panagopoulos (2003), I allowed the innovators who were close to the top of the quality ladder
to generate more knowledge spillovers compared to the ones that are further down. Following
this type of reasoning, in this numerical experiment γi was equal to the inverse of innovator i￿s
ranking. Thus, the 50th innovator had a γi = 1/50.
Bearing in mind that in this model the innovator and the research workers share the pro￿ts,
I allowed the innovator to have an   = 40% share of the pro￿ts. Noting that the role of the
innovator in this framework was very similar to the one in reality played by a venture capitalist,
an   = 40% accords with the average percentage of ￿rm stock that venture capitalists get by
providing ￿rms with capital and expertise. For b I used the share of labor in US production
which is 0.33 and for α the share of capital, which is 0.7.14 Since, production workers and
research workers are homogeneous and employ similar production functions (the production
function for the intermediate input uses ∆A and x in a fashion similar to the way equation
(2) employs ∆A and n)Iu s e dζ =0 .7 and ξ =0 .33. Finally, L was 100, while in accordance
with the recent NSF data (suggesting that research workers are less that 1% percent of the US
working population), the starting values for x and n were 99 and 1 respectively.
On par with Lerner (2004), who examines 150 years of patent protection, this numerical
experiment was repeated for 150 tournaments. In these tournaments λ started from being zero
in the ￿rst tournament and become one in the 150th tournament. Hence, each tournament
become more competitive. The number of participants was derived from equation (3), where
C was arbitrarily chosen as 70% of the winner￿s expected revenues from the innovation. Thus,
in order for an innovator to ￿nd it pro￿table to participate in the tournament his expected




























Figure 1: The x axis represents λ over 150 tournaments. In the ￿rst tournament λ is zero, while in
the last one λ is one.
revenues must be equal to at least seventy percent of the winner￿s. If one is to increase C
then it becomes harder to take part in the tournament, while any decrease in C makes it easier.
Bearing the above in mind, in the ￿rst tournaments, where innovators had starting technologies
that were positioned far apart, only a few had an F that ful￿lled this requirement, while as the
tournament became more competitive, more innovators ful￿lled equation (3).
Running a numerical experiment for δ = 10, which suggests that the 100 competitors were
initially positioned far from each other, the humped shaped relationship of ￿gure 1 was derived.
Ad hoc as the above assumptions may be, this shape does not change drastically if one is to
alter   (in the range of 15% − 60%,w h i c hi st h eu s u a ls h a r eo fp r o ￿ts a venture capitalist
gets), δ (for values between 5 and 20, which allow for some observable heterogeneity among
innovators), C (for values that do not make it either impossible or too easy to participate, i.e.
between 40% and 90%), or if one is to use the alternative probability function. What changes
is the turning point and the steepness of the curve.
206 Conclusions
Recent ￿ndings by Lerner (2004) point to a non-linear relationship between patent strength
and innovation. The aim of this paper is to oﬀer a theoretical explanation for this non-linear
relationship. The model is built upon a patent race in which many heterogeneous innovators
participate. In this model, innovation is sequential. Hence, current innovation builds on past
technology creating current technology. Therefore, the tournament￿s winner is in a better po-
sition to win the future tournament, since he has the more advanced technology. However,
depending on the level of patent protection, the other innovators can re-innovate around the
winner￿s patent and create an innovation of similar magnitude. Subsequently, if patent protec-
tion is weak the innovators who failed to win the tournament will manage to re-innovate around
the winner￿s patent and position themselves close to the winner￿s technology. The closer they
get the more tournament competition increases, because all innovators start the tournament
from similar starting points.
As the model shows, even though higher patent protection increases the innovator￿s incen-
tives to innovate it leads to less tournament competition. However, highly competitive tourna-
ments, such as neck and neck ones, lead to greater innovations because innovators are forced
to use high-risk innovation strategies. Such strategies can potentially lead to great discoveries.
Furthermore, compared to non competitive tournaments, in a competitive tournament more
innovators will ￿nd it pro￿table to enter the tournament, because innovators have comparable
technologies and comparable chances of winning the tournament. The more the innovators who
enter the tournament the more the available knowledge spillovers and the greater the resulting
innovation.
In a nutshell, an increase in patent protection increases the incentives to innovate, but also
leads to less knowledge spillovers and less risky research strategies. Simulating the model, the
above are combined in an inverted U relationship between patent protection and growth. For
future research, one could run a more detailed simulation calibrated using US-EU data. This
would be interesting on account of the considerable increase in US patent protection in the
1980s and the current EU debate on following the US example. As the model suggests, it is
21important to know on what side of the curve the economy is before increasing (or decreasing)
patent protection.
Appendix one





jdt + σ(A)j dz (t)j. As Malliaris and Brock (1987, ch. 2, pg. 101, theo-
rem 7.6) note, the probability density function φ of the innovator￿s technology can be written,












dt =0 . Assuming that the
distribution of A does not change, making the density function φ time invariant, the above dif-










,w h e r ec is a constant.
Based on the latter equation, innovator j￿s expected probability of innovating to a technol-
ogy level that is between some minimum technology level A0 and the upper technology limit
ﬂ A,i sg i v e nb y ,Ep















dA, and it should be equal to 1;
since Aj ∈ (A0, ﬂ A]. Thereby one can express innovator j￿s expected probability of innovating
t oat e c h n o l o g yl e v e lAj that even though it is greater than A0 it is less than the expected
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expected probability that innovator j has of over passing innovator i is given by,
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